A Brief Review on Some Architectures Providing Support for DIFT by Jahanshahi, Ali
A Brief Review on Some Architectures Providing Support for DIFT
Ali Jahanshahi
ajaha004@ucr.edu
University of California, Riverside
Abstract— Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) is a
technique to track potential security vulnerabilities in software
and hardware systems at run time. The last fifteen years have
seen a lot of research work on DIFT, including both hardware-
based and software-based implementations for different types
of processor architectures. This survey briefly reviews some
hardware architectures that provide DIFT support. Starting
from introducing different approaches for hardware based
DIFT, this survey focuses on integrated/in-core architectures.
Protection schemes, including tagging system, tag propagation,
and tag checking for each architecture will be discussed. The
survey is organized in such a way that it illustrates the
evolution of integrated DIFT architectures, each architecture
tries to improve the precious proposed architectures general-
ity/versatility weaknesses. However, improving security while
providing generality and versatility is kind of trade-offs. This
survey compares the architectures from different aspects to
show the trade-offs clearer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Buffer overflows and format strings are the most
frequently-exploited program vulnerabilities. These attacks
give attackers the ability to change spatially limited yet
important memory locations in the vulnerable programs
memory space with malicious code and program pointers.
By exploiting these vulnerabilities, a malicious entity will be
able to take control of a program and perform any operation
with the privileges of the compromised program. Although
taking control of a single privileged program grants attackers
full access to the system, attacks to hijack any program
that has access to sensitive information is considered a
serious security threat. Unfortunately, protecting programs
by preventing the first step of an attack, which is exploiting
program vulnerabilities to modify memory locations, is very
difficult.
There can be as many, if not more, types of exploits as
there are program bugs. Moreover, malicious overwrites can-
not be easily identified since vulnerable programs themselves
perform the writes. Conventional access controls do not work
in this case. As a result, protection schemes which target
detection of malicious overwrites have only had limited
success. They block only the specific types of exploits they
are designed for or they are too restrictive and cannot handle
some legitimate programs such as dynamically generated
code. To thwart a broad range of security exploits, we can
prevent the final step, namely, the unintended use of I/O
inputs.
Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) is a promising
technique to detect security attacks on unmodified binaries
ranging from buffer overflows to SQL injections. The idea
behind DIFT is to tag (taint) untrusted data and track its
propagation through the system. DIFT associates a tag with
every memory location with a specific granularity. Any new
data derived from untrusted data is also tainted using the tag
bits. If tainted data is used in a potentially unsafe manner, for
instance as a code pointer or as a SQL command, a security
exception is immediately raised.
The generality of the DIFT model has led to the devel-
opment of several implementations. To avoid the need for
recompilation, most software DIFT systems use dynamic
binary translation, which introduces significant overheads
ranging from 3x to 37x or even more. Additionally, software
DIFT does not work safely with self-modifying and multi-
threaded programs.
Hardware DIFT systems have been proposed to address
these challenges. They make DIFT practical for all user
or library executables, including multithreaded and self-
modifying code, and even the operating system itself. As
Fig.1 shows, existing DIFT architectures follow three gen-
eral approaches[5]; Integrated/In-core architectures (Fig.1.a)
provide DIFT support within the main pipeline. Most of
the proposed DIFT systems follow the integrated approach,
which performs tag propagation and checks in the processor
pipeline in parallel with regular instruction execution. This
approach does not require an additional core for DIFT func-
tionality and introduces no overhead for inter-core coordina-
tion. Overall, its performance impact in terms of clock cycles
over native execution is minimal. On the other hand, the
integrated approach requires significant modifications to the
processor core. All pipeline stages must be modified to buffer
the tags associated with pending instructions. The register file
and first-level caches must be extended to store the tags for
data and instructions. Alternatively, a specialized register file
or cache that only stores tags and is accessed in parallel with
the regular blocks must be introduced in the processor core.
Overall, the changes to the processor core are significant
and can have a negative impact on design and verification
time. Depending on the constraints, the introduction of DIFT
may also affect the clock frequency. The high upfront cost
and inability to amortize the design complexity over multiple
processor designs can deter hardware vendors from adopting
this approach.
An alternative approach (Fig.1.b) is to offload DIFT func-
tionality to another core in a multi-core chip. The application
runs on one core, while a second general-purpose core runs
the DIFT analysis on the application trace. The advantage
of the offloading approach is that hardware does not need
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Figure. 1. The three design alternatives for DIFT architectures [5]
explicit knowledge of DIFT tags or policies. It can also
support other types of analyses such as memory profiling and
locksets. The core that runs the regular application and the
core that runs the DIFT analysis synchronize only on system
calls. Nevertheless, the cores must be modified to implement
this scheme. The application core is modified to create and
compress a trace of the executed instructions. The core
must select the events that trigger tracing, pack the proper
information (PC, register operands, and memory operands),
and compress in hardware. The trace is exchanged using the
shared caches (L2 or L3). The security core must decompress
the trace using hardware and expose it to software. The
most significant drawback of the multi-core approach is that
it requires a full general-purpose core for DIFT analysis.
Hence, it halves the number of available cores for other
programs and doubles the energy consumption due to the
application under analysis. The cost of the modifications to
each core is also non-trivial, especially for multi-core chips
with simple cores.
Compared to the multi-core DIFT approach, using a co-
processor (Fig.1.C) eliminates the need for a second core
for DIFT and does not require changes to the processor
and cache hierarchy for trace exchange. The co-processor
eliminates the need for any changes to the design, pipeline, or
layout of the main core. Hence, there is no impact on design,
verification or clock frequency of the main core. Coarse-
grained synchronization enables full decoupling between the
main core and the co-processor.
In this survey, we focus on integrated/in-core architectures.
[1] proposes and implementation of DIFT on a real processor,
[2] tries to improve some problems of [1]. [3] extends RISC-
V processor cores to support hardware dynamic information
flow tracking (DIFT). This work is valuable because RISC-
V is among the most promising open source hardware
solutions. [4] tries to extend all the previously mentioned ar-
chitectures to support software-defined metadata processing
which are more general and versatile. Since the architecture
proposed in [4] is more different from the others, it is inves-
tigated separate from other three architectures. And, finally,
we compare the architectures from different perspectives.
II. PROTECTION SCHEME
A DIFT protection scheme relies on three main concepts:
tag initialization, tag propagation and tag check. During
the tag initialization phase, all data items coming from
potentially malicious channels are marked as spurious. In
general, a potentially malicious channel is a legitimate I/O
communication channel through which malicious inputs may
be injected into the application by an attacker. During
tag propagation, the processor, depending on the type of
instruction that is being executed and on the authenticity
of each input operand (as tracked with its corresponding
tag), may decide to mark the result of a computation as
spurious. This allows the processor to keep track of all
information flows generated from spurious inputs at run-
time. Finally, during tag checking, if the processor detects
that a spurious data item is used in an unsafe manner, it
raises a security exception. Thereafter, an exception handler
determines whether the use of the spurious value is legitimate
or not, i.e. whether the program should resume or terminate.
A security policy defines the rules that specify how untrusted
I/O channels are identified, how dependencies are tracked,
and how restrictions on the use of spurious values are
applied. In the following subsections, different aspects of
protection scheme that is considered in implementation of
three architectural support approaches for DIFT will be
described.
A. Security tags and initialization
Tags are used to indicate whether the corresponding data
block is authentic or spurious. Different approaches has been
proposed that extend a one-bit tag to multiple-bit tags in
order to distinguish the values or to keep track of multiple
security policies concurrently; for example, for values, it
may be helpful to distinguish the I/O inputs from the values
generated from them.
Many architectures support byte granularity memory ac-
cesses and I/O. Thus, [1] considers one tag bit per byte.
In their system, the tags for registers are initialized to be
zero at program start-up. Similarly, all memory blocks are
initially tagged with zero. In order to initialize the tag of the
program data, the authors propose execution monitor which
is a software module that manages the protection scheme and
enforces the security policy. The execution monitor tags the
data with one only if they are from a potentially malicious
input channel. The other responsibility of execution manager
is enforcing the security policy, i.e., in case of a trap
generation by processor, the handler checks if the trapped
operation is allowed based on the security policy. If the
operation is legal, the handler returns to the application.
Otherwise, the violation is logged and the application is
terminated. Since trap handler is in the OS, security trap
handling would be costly. In addition, the execution manager
is responsible for tagging potentially malicious inputs. Thus,
it should be able to classify the input data accurately so that
there is no false positive. The classification process is vague
in the proposed architecture and it is a very hard task.
The architecture proposed by [2] reasons that since there
are a lot of security threats, using just one tag bit is not
enough to protect a system. Hence they tried to extend one-
bit tag approach. The authors of [2] use 4-bis tags per word.
The idea behind using 4-bits tag is to protect against a diverse
set of attacks concurrently. In order to initialize tags, security
handlers are implemented as shared libraries pre-loaded by
the dynamic linker. They claimed that in their architecture,
OS ensures that all memory tags are initialized to zero
when pages are allocated and that all processes start in
trusted mode with register tags cleared. The security handler
initializes the policy configuration registers (explained later)
and any necessary tags before disabling the trusted mode
and transferring control to the application. In order to pre-
vent attackers from compromising the security handler, they
introduced another mode orthogonal to user/kernel mode,
named trusted/untrusted mode. In trusted mode, tags are
only accessible by the security handler and not any other
process (even in the kernel mode) can not access/modify
them. By using trusted mode there would be no need to
change the address space on a security trap which results in
fast switching and therefore lower performance overhead in
comparison with [1].
The proposed implementation in [3], similar to [1], uses
1-bit tag for registers and 1-bit tag for memory bytes, i.e., 4
bits per word. In addition to data registers and memory, they
also added a tag bit to PC register. In this implementation,
they extended RISC-V ISA with memory and register tagging
instructions. Also, library of routines are developed providing
APIs to initialize the tags of the data coming from potentially
malicious channels at program start-up.
Optimizing Tag Memory: Adding tag bits to all registers
and memory locations leads to a large memory overhead
equal to 12.5%. In order to address this issue, [1] introduced
Multi-Granularity Security Tags. The key idea behind multi-
granularity tags is that writing each byte/word separately is
not the common case in the applications. In practice, the
operating system should maintain two more bits for each
page to indicate the type of security tags that the page has.
Just after an allocation, a new authentic page holds a per
page tag, which is indicated by type value 00. Upon the
first store operation with a non-zero security tag to the page,
a processor generates an exception for tag allocation. The
Figure. 2. Tag Propagation Register (TPR) proposed in [3]
operating system determines the new granularity of security
tags for the page, allocates memory space for the tags, and
initializes the tags to be all zero. If the granularity of the
store operation is smaller than a quad-word, per-byte security
tags are used. Otherwise, per-quad-word tags, which only
have 1.6% overhead, are chosen. If there is a store operation
with a small granularity for a page that currently has per-
quad-word security tags, the operating system reallocates
the space for per-byte tags and initializes them properly.
Although this operation may seem expensive, the authors
of []r2004 claimed that it is very rare (happens in less than
1% of pages). It is worth mentioning that in all mentioned
approaches, the security tags are a part of program state, and
should be managed by the operating system accordingly. On
a context switch, the tags for registers are saved and restored
with the register values. The operating system manages a
separate tag space for each process, just as it manages a
separate virtual memory space per process.
B. Tag propagation
A spurious value is the one that may have unexpectedly
changed by I/O inputs due to bugs in the program. Once
injected, spurious values can again cause unexpected changes
to other values through many dierent dependencies. Each
of the mentioned approaches categorizes possible dependen-
cies for spurious information flows into different classes.
Processors dynamically track spurious information flow by
tagging the result of an operation as spurious if it has a
dependency on spurious data. To be able to enforce various
security policies, the dependencies to be tracked and the
way that they are propagating are controlled by a bit vector.
[1] calls this bit vector Propagation Control Register (PCR),
which is set to a proper value by the execution monitor
based on the specified security policy. [2] names the bit
vector Tag Propagation Register (TPR). Since there are four
1-bit tag for enforcing concurrent policies, four TPRs are
used in [2]. In both approaches they do not track any form
of control dependency. They stated that tracking control
dependency is not useful for detecting malicious software
attacks considered in their work. Their reason is that for
control transfers that can compromise the program, such
as register-based jumps, the use of spurious values should
simply be checked and stopped.
Fig.2 shows the TPR structure implemented in [3]. As it
is illustrated, and mentioned before, they considere different
dependency classes. In order to propagate the tags, there
should be propagation rules for each application which is
defined by the programmer through the provided API before
starting the program. Table I shows an example of tag
TABLE I
AN EXAMPLE OF TAG PROPAGATION REGISTER CONFIGURATION [3]
Field Value Rule
Load/Store Enable 001 Source tag enabled
Load/Store Mode 10 Dest tag = Source tag
Logical Mode 10 Dest tag = Source1 tag OR Source2 tag
Comparison Mode 00 No Propagation
Shift Mode 10 Dest tag = Source1 tag OR Source2 tag
Jump Mode 10 JAL: New PC = Old PC
JALR: New PC = Source tag
Branch Mode 00 No propagation
Integer Arith Mode 10 Dest tag = Source1 tag OR Source2 tag
propagation rules specified for securing an application from
a specific attack. To make it clearer, in the propagation rule
example of Table I, as an example, the result tag of integer
arithmetic operations is logical OR of it’s two operands’
tag. It means that if any of the operands is spurious, the
result of the operation would be tagged as spurious too. Tag
propagation rules should be designed carefully because a
mistake by the rule designer would be targeted by a security
threat.
C. Checking the Tags and Security Policies
The tag-check rules restrict the operations that may be
performed on tagged data. For example, a tag-check rule
may be “If a tag of a register is set to one then it cannot be
used to address the data memory”. Given an instruction, the
corresponding check field specifies which operands tags are
checked in order to generate a security exception. If the check
bit for an operand tag is set to one and the corresponding tag
is equal to one, an exception is raised. [1] uses Trap Control
Register (TCR) that is set by the execution monitor based on
the security policy. Similarly, as stated before, [2] uses four
TCRs to keep track of four security policies concurrently.
The security policy defines legitimate uses of I/O values
by specifying the untrusted I/O channels, information flows
to be tracked (PCR/TPR), tag check conditions (TCR), and
software checks on a trap. If the runtime behavior of a pro-
gram violates the security policy, the program is considered
to be compromised. Ideally, the security policy should only
allow legitimate operations of the protected program. The
policy can be based either on a general invariant that should
be followed by almost all programs or on the invariants
for a specific application. Also, the restrictions defining the
security policy can be based either on where spurious values
can be used or on general program behavior.
The proposed tag propagation/checking rules in [1], [2],
[3] are performed by small and simple logical (AND/OR)
operations. Thus, tag propagation and checking logic are
embedded in execution stage (as a part of ALU) that result
in low power and area overhead. Since tag propagation and
check is performed in parallel with the actual operation, their
logic would not affect the critical path.
III. SOFTWARE-DEFINED METADATA PROCESSING
The designs that were mentioned in previous section
have made the hardware metadata computation configurable
TABLE II
TAG PROPAGATION RULE FORMAT IN PUMP AND OTHER
ARCHITECTURES
Arch Propagation Rule
[1], [2], [3] O : (OP1, OP2, MR) ⇒ (R)
PUMP O : (PC, CI, OP1, OP2, MR) ⇒ (PCNew , R)
but one of their main limitation is that they use few bits
to represent metadata and only support a limited class of
policies. However, fully securing systems will require more
than memory safety and isolation. Beside limited bits for
the tag, tag propagation rules for every operation (O) in
previous approaches only has to do with the operands’ tag
(OP1/OP2/MR) that produce the result tag (R). On the other
side of the arena, attacks are rapidly evolving to exploit any
forms of vulnerability. Thus, a flexible security architecture
that can be quickly adapted to this ever-changing security
world is needed. This can be achieved by supporting more
general policies and more flexible tag propagation rules in
hardware. As shown in Table II, a general propagation rule
for any operation (O) should be able to decide that what
the tag on the program counter in the next machine state
(PCNew) and the tag on the instructions result (R) should
be if the current tag on the program counter is PC, the tag on
the current instruction is CI, the tags on its input operands (if
any) are OP1 and OP2, and the tag on the memory location
(in case of load/store) is MR. In order to provide support
for extensible, software-defined metadata processing with
low overhead, [4] introduces an architectural model named
the Programmable Unit for Metadata Processing (PUMP).
PUMP is an extension to a conventional RISC processor
(Alpha) and an in-order implementation with a 5-stage
pipeline.
Fig. 3 shows the processor pipeline of the PUMP. As it
is shown, tags are added to all memory elements. The idea
behind PUMP is that, for checking the security policy of
each operation, a software policy function should be invoke.
Invoking a policy function to check whether an operation is
allowed or not costs a lot of performance and power overhead
because for each operation there should be a context switch
to policy function so that it can check if that operation is
allowed or not. Statistics shows that security policies are
limited and have high locality. Thus, they solved this problem
by using a Rule Cache added to a stage before committing
the executed operation. The operations are checked if they
are allowed to commit only by looking up Rule Cache. It
will be explained the scenario of a rule miss in Rule Cache
in details.
Metadata Tags: Pointer-sized tags are used in this architec-
ture to make the policy writer able to point to any memory
location for addressing tags. This notion of software-defined
metadata and its representation as a pointer-sized tag extends
previous tagging approaches such as [1], [2], [3], where only
a few bits are used for tags with fixed interpretation. In order
to make the previous approaches extensible, in this archi-
tecture, every word is associated with a pointer-sized tag.
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF THE REVIEWED DIFT ARCHITECTURES
Arch Tag size Trap Handler Overhead New
Instruction
Adding
Trust Mode
# of Policies Versatility
[1] 1/byte OS Level 1.4% memory, 1.1% perf Yes No One Low, I/O tagged by OS
[2] 4/word User Level 7.17% logic, 1.34% perf Yes Yes Four I/O tagged by sysAdmin
[3] 1/byte – 12.5% memory, 0.83% logic Yes No One High, I/O tagged by the user
[4] word/word User Level 110% area, <10% perf Yes Yes Unbounded High, I/O tagged by the user
Figure. 3. the PUMP processor Pipeline
Thus, the tag is large enough to indirect to a data structure
in memory which leads to supporting unbounded metadata.
All tag manipulation is defined and implemented with PUMP
rules and stored in Rule Cache. In this architecture, even
worse than the previous approaches, tag memory overhead
is a lot (around 2x). In practice, they did not allotted pointer-
sized tags. Instead, the authors used 12-bits tag for L1 cache
and 16-bits tag for L2 cache. In order to make tag bits
consistent when moving the data between caches, they used
a translation approach. They mentioned that other methods
like Multi-Granularity Security Tags can also be used.
Propagation Rules: The rules format used in this architec-
ture allows two output tags to be computed from up to five
input tags, which makes it a more powerful and versatile
architecture. For some security policies, there is no need for
all five input tag, and should not be considered. In Fig. 3,
Don’t Care component is responsible for removing any of
PC, CI, OP1, OP2, MR in Rule Cache lookup if they are not
needed for a specific operation (O). By doing so, L1 PUMP
cache would have less entropy that results in higher hit rate.
Rule cache is added to architecture to support single-cycle
common-case computation on metadata. It means, as long as
we hit in this cache, any extra cycles would not be added to
the execution of the program. Rules are not generated in this
cache, this cache is just to look them up. In case of a rule
miss, a user-level miss handler routine will be invoked to
generate a new rule base on the operation, its operands, PC,
and CI. Once the rule generated and placed in the Rule cache,
it will be used in the next accesses. Obviously, the hit/miss
rate of this cache depends on how good the user/policy write
write the policies, the higher the locality of a policy, the
higher hit rate, and the lower performance overhead.
Miss Handler: will be invoked in case of a rule miss in
the rules’ last level cache. In order to serve the miss, the
processor state will be stored in specific registers (added to
the processor for this purpose), and the control of the proces-
sor goes to the policy function to decide if the operation is
Algorithm 1 N-Policy Miss Handler
1: for i=1 to N do
2: – M[i] = {op, PC[i], CI [i], OP1[i], OP2[i], MR[i]}
3: – {pc[i] , res[i]} = policy[i](M[i])
4: PCnew = canonicalize([pc[1], pc[2], ..., pc[N]])
5: R = canonicalize([res[1], res[2], ..., res[N]])
allowed or not. In case the operation which caused the miss is
a valid operation, new rule will be generated and installed in
the Rule Cache. In miss handler mode, Rule cache is ignored.
Similar to [2], a new mode is introduced in order to provide
isolation between the privileged miss handler and the rest
of the system software and user code. This mode which is
called miss handler operational mode is controlled by a bit
in the processor state. Miss handler is designed in such a
way that multiple policies can be enforced simultaneously.
Alg.1 shows the general behavior of the composite miss
handler for any N policies. canonicalize function is utilized
to minimize the number of distinct tags (and hence rules)
by using a single tag for logically equivalent metadata. This
helps increasing Rule Cache hit rate, which has direct effect
on the performance.
IV. COMPARISON
Adding DIFT support to both hardware and software
introduces overheads. Table III summarizes the different
aspects of the proposed architectures that support DIFT. In
Table III, trap handler field means that the security traps
are addressed in which level of the system. Also Versatility
means that how convenient it is for an application developer
to decide which data to tag as potentially malicious data
which should be tracked.
V. CONCLUSION
In this survey, we briefly reviewed four architectures that
provided DIFT support. Adding DIFT support to processors
introduces some area/power overhead. As expected, the more
secure, general, and versatile the architecture be, the more
overhead will be added to the processor.
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